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GSAT

104 Posts
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  1. [verwijderd] 12 augustus 2014 16:07
    Voorbeurs 4$,helaas fake,goedkeuring gaat waarschijnlijk nog enkele maanden duren,dus koers heeft mijn inziens weinig stijgingspotentie,tot die tijd.

    Gr ber
  2. [verwijderd] 13 augustus 2014 09:31
    Goedemorgen,

    Goedkeuring TLPS waarschijnlijk pas Eind van het jaar,tel daar nog 1 kwartaal extra bij op,dan pas richting Maart??.Oftewel
    Voorlopig dood geld?? Wie ziet het anders??

    Gr ber

  3. [verwijderd] 13 augustus 2014 15:33
    Tja, wat is wijsheid? Echte triggers voor een koersverhoging zijn er volgens mij voorlopig niet.

    - Blijven zitten en het beschouwen als dood geld, tot aan de FCC?
    - Nu uitstappen, tijdelijk eventueel ergens anders in en bij een lagere koers weer in kunnen stappen en dan alsnog richting FCC?

    Bart
  4. [verwijderd] 13 augustus 2014 21:28
    Ik ben eruit na een mooie rit van ruim 50%. Ik zie een groter neerwaarts dan opwaarts potentieel. Wellicht stap ik later op een lager niveau weer in.
  5. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 2 oktober 2014 18:48

    Why Globalstar (GSAT) Stock Is Plummeting Today
    BY Andrew Meola Follow |
    10/01/14 - 02:49 PM EDT |

    NEW YORK (TheStreet) -- Shares of Globalstar (GSAT) plummeted 16.94% to $3.04 in afternoon trading Wednesday on speculation that Kerrisdale Capital would announce it is short the satellite telecommunications company.

    The investment management firm announced its Chief Investment Officer, Sahm Adrangi, would make a live presentation on Monday, October 6 about an unidentified "multibillion-dollar company" that the firm is short.

    "This is the best short idea Mr. Adrangi has come across during his time running Kerrisdale," the company announced. "The equity is fundamentally worth zero and we believe that we clearly and irrefutably demonstrate that the business is insolvent."

    The stock hit an intraday low of $2.41, slightly higher than the 52-week low of $2.33. More than 28 million shares had changed hands as of 2:46 p.m., compared to the average volume of 3,318,350.

    Separately, TheStreet Ratings team rates GLOBALSTAR INC as a "sell" with a ratings score of D-. TheStreet Ratings Team has this to say about their recommendation:
  6. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 2 oktober 2014 18:52
    quote:

    Mickey_Mantle schreef op 5 juni 2014 17:31:

    DZR,

    Wat zit jij er naast... Blijf maar vasthouden aan jouw (waan-)ideeen, we gaan zien wat er gaat gebeuren.

    Ondertussen loopt GSAT verder op, en daalt IRDM....
    In werkelijkheid ging het net andersom: GSAT in elkaar gestort en Iridium gestegen.
  7. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 7 oktober 2014 09:44
    Globalstar -10.3% after Kerrisdale releases short report • 1:43 PM
    Eric Jhonsa, SA News Editor

    Confirming last week's rumors, Kerrisdale Capital has released a report (.pdf) declaring Globalstar (NYSEMKT:GSAT) "the most egregious $4 billion stock promotion since Sino-Forest."

    Kerrisdale predicts Globalstar's TLPS Wi-Fi service concept "will never be commercially viable," and thinks its spectrum assets are "unlikely to generate material value in any other use case."
    It adds TLPS "would face power limits that are 400x lower" than those seen for spectrum owned by mobile carriers, as well as other technical challenges. "With over $500 million of net debt and an unprofitable core business, GSAT needs more than stories to keep the lights on."
    Shares are down 26% from where they closed on Tuesday, the day before Kerrisdale rumors emerged.

    GSAT price at time of publication: $2.69.
  8. [verwijderd] 7 oktober 2014 10:47
    Op 'future value' aandelen zoals Globalstar heeft nieuws zoals Kerrisdale doet natuurlijk een grote impact, omdat GSAT (nog) geen rechtvaardige omzet/winst etc heeft aanzien van de huidige MCAP. Er zit natuurlijk een hoop speculatie in. Vergeet niet dat Soros hier een tijdje terug rum 2.5 miljoen stocks heeft gekocht en deze man is ook alles behalve gek. Ik ben bijna op de top uitgestapt, zie post hierboven, en wellicht koop ik op lagere niveau's weer terug.
  9. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 7 oktober 2014 21:46

    Ruerd Heeg, Ruerd Heeg's Book on Value Investing (Dutch) (58 clicks)

    The Value Of The Globalstar Spectrum According To Kerrisdale Capital
    Oct. 7, 2014 1:39 PM ET | 3 comments | About: Globalstar, Inc. (GSAT)

    Disclosure: The author has no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More...)
    Summary

    Kerrisdale Capital released its short thesis on Globalstar.
    Their estimate of the value of Globalstar's stock is based on prices from past transactions.
    Based on this reasoning Globalstar is worth at most $0.67.
    There might be a mistake in their calculation in which case the value of Globalstar's stock is at most $1.65.

    Yesterday Kerrisdale Capital published a 67-page pdf containing a short thesis on Globalstar (NYSEMKT:GSAT). The story is very well researched and I recommend everyone reading it, entirely. It's not a difficult read either. So it shouldn't be necessary that I write this article. Yet I know that most people don't like reading documents like this one. Therefore I have written this article describing what I think are their most important points.

    Background

    Others have covered this stock extensively, so I will give only a short description here. Globalstar is a company that has some satellite operations. However its market cap is much more than one would expect based on conventional metrics, such as PB, PE and EV/EBITDA. The difference lies in the value of Globalstar's 2.4 GHz spectrum. At the moment this frequency isn't worth anything. When the FCC grants Globalstar's request to use this frequency on earth it could be very valuable.

    My positions

    Unfortunately I can not short this stock, since I invest mainly in non-marginable securities like net-nets and non-tradable or distressed CVR's. But otherwise I would short it since I think it is a great short. So please take my independent advice, but only as a starting point for your own research.

    I had some shares of Globalstar but sold a couple of months ago. After I sold I regretted my decision since then the stock price surged from $3 to almost $4.5. My conclusion was that I had been a bit too careful and should have waited until the FCC decision was nearby. Often stock prices go up when the outcome of a binary event approaches. In this case it didn't, which was a bad sign. It looks as if Kerrisdale knew this and waited until the decision was nearby.

    But why did I buy this stock? I remember looking at this stock already in the Summer of 2013 when screening stocks with a low PB. I skipped Globalstar then because I thought it had too much debt. In December 2013, after gaining SA Pro access for a month, I was able to read Paulo Santos' Pro article on Globalstar. At the end of December I bought Globalstar for $2 based on Paulo's analysis and some comments specifying the value of the spectrum from another investor on SA. Unfortunately I couldn't verify the claims regarding the value of the spectrum. Therefore I only bought a very small position and I sold it early.

    How could so many people be fooled so easily?

    After reading Kerrisdale's document it doesn't seem that difficult to value a frequency. Yet, beforehand, not many people thought they were capable of valuing Globalstar's frequency. As a result I haven't seen a detailed analysis, like Kerrisdale's one, on SA. Neither has Globalstar's management provided detailed information on the value of the spectrum. Instead people started just assuming the frequency had some value when approved by the FCC. They were probably guided by qualitative hints from Globalstar's management. Then a positive feedback loop started: initial guesses gave investors confidence to buy at higher prices, the higher prices were followed by bolder guesses which resulted in even higher prices.

    In addition some people, including myself, seem to have unconsciously substituted an easier question for a difficult question. Even an easy question we sometimes substitute for another. For example, what is heavier: a pound of feathers or a pound of iron? Our unconscious mind tries to answer a different question: which material has greater density, feathers or iron?

    Here the easy question is whether Globalstar's frequency will be approved for terrestrial use by the FCC. The difficult question is whether this frequency has much value. So people might have unconsciously answered the easy question while using this answer for the difficult question. So they came up with the answer yes on the FCC approval question, and unconsciously thought they had answered the question on the value of the frequency. Of course that is a bit strange but it's a common mistake. This mistake might have prevented people from doing research on the value question.
    Kerrisdale's Short Thesis

    Kerrisdale Capital tries to answer the fundamental question for valuing Globalstar: what is the value of the 2.6 GHz spectrum. According to them the value of a frequency depends on the following 3 properties:

    The population density.
    The area that can be reached with a sender/receiver station.
    The bandwidth.

    Basically the more people can be reached with a single base station the more valuable the frequency. Higher frequencies cover a smaller area than lower frequencies using base stations with similar power output. Therefore higher frequencies are less worth than lower frequencies. Finally, the more MHz of band width the more information can be carried with the frequency, thus increasing its value.
  10. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 7 oktober 2014 21:50
    Kerrisdale presents a comparison between price points from auctions and other transactions. These price points are given in dollars/MHz pop. This is the price in dollars per MHz of bandwidth per person. So the original pricing data has been divided by the bandwidth that was sold and the number of inhabitants in the area where the frequency can be used.

    Their analysis indeed shows that high frequencies are worth less in dollars/MHz pop than low frequencies. So they wondered whether the difference would still be visible after correcting for the area that can be reached with a single base station. They find that in that case the price of a high frequency is about the same as the price of a low frequency. So in that case the measure is something like dollars per MHz pop m2.

    Based on these different pricing points they also conclude that the value of the 2.4 MHz GSAT frequency is less than $0.3/MHz pop. That seems highly plausible to me. But with a simple analysis of Globalstar's stock price they arrive at an implied value of $1.19/MHz pop. They also found that Globalstar has estimated the value of the frequency at only $0.5/MHz pop in 2010. This contradicts their in my view weak rebuttal of Kerrisdale's accusations. They have announced a conference call but given their weak reaction so far I don't expect much.

    One thing that I could not find in the paper is the effect of the duration on the price of a frequency. It does make a difference whether a license is perpetual or expires in 20 years or so.
    Can I check this myself?

    Going through a detailed 67-page document and writing an article about it in just one day is not easy. But the differential disclosure mentioned above is an extremely bad sign. In addition I have no reason to mistrust the pricing points given in their paper.

    Yet I found one mistake in their paper. On page 49 they use 10 MHz for Globalstar's bandwidth while I think this must be 20 MHz, or more accurate 19.275 MHz, consistent with what Globalstar's presentation in 2010 says. The difference is about $900 million in market cap or about $1 per share. Therefore the fair value of Globalstar's stock should be at most $1.65 instead Kerrisdale's estimate of $0.67. Kerrisdale's computation could still be right so any comments on this are highly appreciated!

    I also suppose frequencies in areas where people have a higher purchasing power are worth more than in poorer areas. So a frequency for the countryside in Brazil is worth much less than one in the center of New York. Fortunately Kerrisdale's conclusions don't depend on pricing data outside the US.

    In December 2012 there was an auction in The Netherlands, a densely populated area with high purchasing power. So I suppose spectrum must be expensive in The Netherlands. Indeed, after paying €1.352 billion for 4G spectrum KPN did a rights issue. But how much did they pay per MHz pop? Less than €0.67! This is about 3 times more than $0.3 but take into account that only a quarter of the KPN spectrum was 2.6 GHz spectrum. A third was 800/900 MHz spectrum. According to the pricing points in Kerrisdale's report the value of this low frequency spectrum is about $1.5/MHz pop. Another third was in the 1800 MHz band which might be worth the average price KPN paid.

    Final remarks

    A valuation of Kerrisdale shows that Globalstar might be a good short even after the recent crash of the stock. Whether this is true or not depends on the correctness of certain details in their calculation as I have explained above. On top of that they provide many reasons why the value of the Globalstar frequency is worth even less than $0.30/MHz pop. I haven't discussed these reasons because I wanted to focus on their main points. But another issue that should be mentioned is that the frequency might become valuable but so far there is no buyer.

    Overall they have done a great job, so I recommend reading their document. Their main arguments for a lower price are the value of the Globalstar spectrum. To estimate this value they use prices from past transactions. Their reasoning combines these prices with the notion that high frequencies are much less worth than low frequencies because of their shorter reach. I have found an additional pricing point that seems to confirm their data.

    To avoid being a victim of debacles like this one always do your own research. Ask yourself the right questions and try to answer them. With Globalstar this might have been possible for most of us although it seemed difficult. But if you can't do this, then it is better to stay away from the stock.
  11. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 8 oktober 2014 18:21
    It Would Be Wise To Sell Globalstar
    Oct. 8, 2014 10:24 AM ET | 7 comments | About: Globalstar, Inc. (GSAT)

    Disclosure: The author has no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I might sell GSAT short if it spikes on FCC approval. (More...)

    Summary

    I was once bullish on Globalstar from much lower levels.
    However, after reading the Kerrisdale Capital bear thesis, it's clear that the wise posture is to be bearish the name.
    There is little reason to hold Globalstar, though the best timing to sell is rather uncertain.

    Back in August 23, 2013 I wrote the article "Globalstar: Hidden Value In The Spectrum" where I explained that Globalstar (NYSEMKT:GSAT), then trading at $0.64, had significant upside given the potential value of its spectrum and its upcoming strategy to re-purpose it from satellite usage to terrestrial usage. Globalstart hoped to achieve this by creating a new (and paid) WiFi channel.

    Globalstar was brought to my attention due to tests Amazon.com (NASDAQ:AMZN) was running in its spectrum. The thesis around the name seemed solid, and thus I calculated its upside to be as much as 405% to $3.24. This was eerily prescient, as the stock went on to rally to, and beyond, this target. Lately, however, the stock has been on a quick trip down and now stands at $2.34. Still well above where I started talking about it, but significantly below its prior highs.

    I thus return to the name. But this time, not to recommend it but to say investors ought to sell it. A very powerful bear thesis has been published by Kerrisdale Capital, and this thesis is clearly better than the one I espoused, more than one year ago. We can sum up the bear thesis as follows:

    GSAT's WiFi concept will never be commercially viable. This is due to the fact that with the emergence of the 5Ghz WiFi band, there will now be 25 free WiFi channels, so adding a single channel doesn't make much difference. Furthermore, the "WiFi congestion" theory also fails in real life, with technological advances and existing spectrum being enough to, for instance, simultaneously service a stadium full of people. Also, enabling existing devices for GSAT's spectrum is not an easy or commercially-appealing task, and there is no international market for GSAT's spectrum.
    GSAT's spectrum is not valuable for terrestrial purposes. Power limitations, high frequency traveling over shorter distances, interference, make it so.
    GSAT's actual business is weak and headed for default. Self-explanatory - the company is running into debt covenants.

    Kerrisdale capital also makes many other realistic claims, including an interesting correlation between the value of the spectrum and its frequency. Either way, Kerrisdale sees GSAT's value as being somewhere between $0 per share and $0.67 per share. And given Kerrisdale's explanation, I fully agree with it.

    In light of this powerful thesis, the logical thing to do for someone holding GSAT would be to sell and try his luck somewhere else. The odds are clearly stacked against GSAT. The very least any GSAT shareholder ought to do is to thoroughly read the Kerrisdale thesis (linked above).

    Timing

    GSAT is down heavily as it is. There might be a rebound. One such event which could produce a rebound would be the final FCC approval for the terrestrial usage of GSAT's spectrum.

    I believe the right timing to sell GSAT would be either now, or right after FCC gives final approval, leading to a short term spike in the stock. The bear thesis applies even if the FCC gives final approval, so such an event should not be seen as saving GSAT.

    Wildcard

    Amazon.com once tested Globalstar's spectrum. Indeed, that was the reason why I was introduced to the stock. It worked as it should. There's a wildcard in this fact. Once FTC awards Globalstar its final approval, there's the wild chance that Amazon.com might somehow decide to acquire it to launch its own nationwide WiFi network.

    It would probably be a boneheaded decision given the spectrum's limitations, but Amazon.com is known to make systematic bonehead decisions - it mostly depends on whether Jeff Bezos wakes up wanting to have his nationwide WiFi network, as he's known to disregard specialized knowledge.

    I wouldn't put too much faith on this happening, though. But if one sells the stock, one ought not to feel sorry if, indeed, this low-likelihood event then takes place.

    Conclusion

    I fully agree with Kerrisdale Capital on GSAT. The stock will be somewhere between worthless and $0.67 in due time, unless something wild like Amazon.com buying it out happens. One should not place his investor's hat on such unlikely event, so the wise thing to do would be to sell the stock.

    At the very least, any GSAT investor should completely read Kerrisdale's thesis. (here's the link again)

    seekingalpha.com/article/2548135-it-w...
  12. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 11 oktober 2014 14:16
    Conclusion

    These risks are not new to GSAT, but at today’s market value they are being heavily discounted. It is far riskier to hold GSAT shares than any potential reward can justify.

    This is a great lesson in following PTT’s Methodology, which told us to sell GSAT when it tripled to $2.01. Even when it was tempting to stay in and get the additional upside (which proved temporarily to be 100%), the odds of winning by doing so were no better than a coin toss.

    I don’t think that Kerrisdale is correct to assign it a value of zero, since the novel use case of GSAT’s spectrum still exists, but their work emphasizes appropriately the risks associated with it. As GSAT’s valuation increased, the stock price implied an ever more unrealistic probability of monetization of its spectrum.

    Our methodology is all about risk/reward. What today may be an opportunity to take advantage of the market’s undervaluing of a probability may tomorrow be an opportunity to overvalue the same probability ourselves.

    I believe the risks of investing in GSAT, whether in a short or a long position, are too great, given the risks of movement both to the upside, as bulls predictably prepare a rebuttal to the Kerrisdale short thesis, and to the downside as the market begins to reconsider the auction value of GSAT’s spectrum.

    We are much better off deepening our knowledge of our current picks, whose true risk to reward has yet to be priced in, and looking for new ones.

    pttalpha.com/gsat-kerrisdale-short-th...
  13. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 11 oktober 2014 14:19
    Satellite is Not a Great Business to Be In

    GSAT generates just a modest EBIDTA from its satellite business. Its 1H-2014 run rate has GSAT on track to reach $18-20M in EBITDA for the year.

    The business carries around $545M in debt, not counting the convertible debt, which is in-the-money. Even using the EBITDA multiplier of 7.5 that is arbitrarily favored by sell-side analysts, the company’s enterprise value is $0, only because it can’t be negative.
  14. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 28 oktober 2014 23:11
    Globalstar's Testing Continues to Mislead

    Globalstar has thoroughly doubled down on its overblown claims about Wi-Fi congestion, even the claim that the 2.4GHz band is already "exhausted" today and "has come to an end effectively as a public resource" (yet, somehow, 2.4GHz simultaneously remains "the primary band for Wi-Fi"). But one of the images it submitted to the FCC in its most recent experimental license application, stripped of its spin, undermines those claims. Globalstar and Jarvinian like to toss around colorful spectrograms, giving the appearance of rich technical content - yet, they usually lack important information like z-axis labels, making it impossible to interpret them quantitatively. (For example, what power level does "red" correspond to? Rarely is there a legend, let alone a readable one.) The point of these i

    Conclusion

    In isolation, Globalstar's latest experimental license application doesn't mean much; for TLPS, it's not the first and likely won't be the last. This does nothing to change our fundamental thesis that TLPS is a non-solution to a non-problem. But the materials supporting the application and its predecessors serve as a useful reminder that there is no well-defined business case for TLPS, just an array of vague hopes and dreams supported by inadequate data. The Globalstar bubble still has billions of dollars left before it fully deflates.
  15. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 31 oktober 2014 11:45

    Richard Pearson, MoxReports (695 clicks)
    Long/short equity, special situations, contrarian, short only
    Profile| Send Message|
    Follow (2,503 followers)
    Globalstar: Elements Of Promotion
    Oct. 30, 2014 10:00 AM ET | About: Globalstar, Inc. (GSAT), Includes: NEON, UNXL

    Disclosure: The author is short GSAT. (More...)
    Summary

    Even after a recent drop, Globalstar is still up 7x from its 2013 lows. Yet the financials have deteriorated to the point of functional insolvency.
    Globalstar has all the elements of promotion: mostly retail investor base, lack of top 20 research coverage and a volatile share price with no support.
    Understanding the promotional elements may tell us more about the future share price than trying to understand the technology alone.
    In the past, I have written about very similar promotions that fell by 60-80% once exposed.

    A few weeks ago, Kerrisdale Capital gave a presentation delivering its short thesis on Globalstar Inc. (NYSEMKT:GSAT). Prior to rumors of Kerrisdale's presentation, Globalstar had been trading at close to $4.00, with a market cap of nearly $4 billion.

    After a wave of back and forth conference calls and presentations by Kerrisdale and Globalstar management, the stock bottomed at $1.56 - a decline of nearly 60% in two weeks.

    Since then, the stock has rebounded slightly to just over $2.00. The question now becomes how to play Globalstar. The stock is still down 40% since pre-Kerrisdale, but investors must remember that the stock is up from just 30 cents in 2013. As a result, the stock is still up 7x since just last year, even as the company's financial results have become increasingly strained.
  16. forum rang 10 DeZwarteRidder 10 november 2014 22:58

    Globalstar: Evaluating Bankruptcy Risk
    Nov. 10, 2014 9:30 AM ET | 9 comments | About: Globalstar, Inc. (GSAT)

    Disclosure: The author is short GSAT. (More...)
    Summary

    Globalstar currently sits under a large debt load of over $600 million even as it loses money every quarter.
    The most recent quarter showed only $4 million of EBITDA, falling short of required targets in the credit facility.
    However, bankruptcy risk can be mitigated by taking advantage of the large market cap to conduct a large financing.
    Similar restructurings were completed in 2009 and 2013.
    Evaluating the recent bankruptcy of GTAT is instructive in identifying the risks in Globalstar.

    Shares of Globalstar (NYSEMKT:GSAT) have been on a roller coaster ride ever since Kerrisdale Capital presented a short thesis on the company in early October. The shares fell from just under $4.00 to as low as $1.56, before rebounding to the current level of around $2.60. Some of the recent rebound has been due to the release of quarterly earnings where Globalstar revealed a slight growth in subscribers and revenues, along with posting over $4 million in "adjusted EBITDA".

    (click to enlarge)

    A key point within the Kerrisdale thesis is that Globalstar will inevitably go bankrupt and hit a share price of true zero. I disagree with some points of the Kerrisdale thesis, but I do see that an analysis of the recent bankruptcy of GT Advanced Technologies (OTCPK:GTATQ) can shed some light on the risks that current holders of Globalstar are facing.

    This becomes particularly relevant in light of Globalstar's recently released quarterly earnings. It is now clear that Globalstar is on track to once again fall short of its required EBITDA covenants as required in its loan facility. This is currently only being permitted by an ever growing equity "cure" provision.

    The EBITDA requirements of the credit facility are also spelled out more succinctly in the 10Q. As shown, the EBITDA requirements are as follows:
    Period Minimum Amount

    1/1/14-6/30/14 $9.9 million

    7/1/14-12/31/14 $14.1 million

    1/1/15-6/30/15 $17.0 million

    7/1/15-12/31/15 $23.5 million

    The first problem becomes immediately apparent. In the first 6 month period (1/1/14-6/30/14), Globalstar generated around $6 million of EBITDA, falling short of the $9.9 million target by over $3 million. Only an equity "cure" contribution allowed Globalstar to avoid default. It is easy for investors to miss this because EBITDA is not explicitly broken out in the 10Q or 10K. It must be calculated.

    The second problem is that the EBITDA requirement in the credit facility escalates over time, even as Globalstar's performance seems to be deteriorating. So while Globalstar was around 30% short on EBITDA in 1H 2014, the target for 2H 2014 is now more than 40% higher than that level. By the time we get to 2H 2015, the target is more than double what it was in the previous half.

    Adjusted EBITDA for Globalstar (as disclosed on their conference call) was just over $4 million for the quarter. Yet the company needs to produce over $14 million for the combined period of Q3 and Q4. Based on the historical runs rates of around $3 million per quarter, this now looks highly unlikely.

    If Globalstar can maintain a constant $4 million per quarter in EBITDA ($8 million per half year), then it will have earned a CUMULATIVE TOTAL of $32 million in EBITDA over the periods specified in the table above. Yet the amount required in just the 2nd half of 2015 alone is already nearly $24 million. Globalstar falls short by nearly an additional $32 million during this time.

    Globalstar has already disclosed in its risk factors that:

    An inability to comply with the financial and nonfinancial covenants contained in the Facility Agreement could have significant implications. Our Facility Agreement contains a number of financial and nonfinancial covenants. Our ability to comply with these covenants will depend on our future performance, which may be affected by events beyond our control. Our failure to comply with these covenants would represent an event of default. An event of default under the Facility Agreement would permit the lenders to accelerate the indebtedness under the Facility Agreement. That acceleration would permit holders of our obligations under other agreements that contain cross-acceleration provisions to accelerate that indebtedness.

    So in short, Globalstar is already failing to meet the EBITDA targets specified in its credit facility. The only reason it has not been deemed in default is due to an equity "cure" contribution that was made. But as the targets get increasingly higher, it becomes harder and harder for Globalstar to continue raising new equity every 6 months in larger and larger sizes. A subsequent default on the credit facility therefore looks unavoidable at some point. This default then triggers cross acceleration on the company's other obligations. The biggest question mark is simply the timing of these events.

    However, I do believe that in the short/medium term Globalstar will avoid a bankruptcy, but only by issuing large amounts of common stock and more convertible debt. It will also need to once again restructure its existing debt. This will likely push the share price to around $1.00, but could still avoid the specter of bankruptcy. This is largely what the company was able to do in 2008/2009, which pushed the share price at the time down to around 30 cents even though it avoided bankruptcy. A similar set of restructurings occurred in 2013, and again we saw a 30 cent share price. Globalstar had originally filed for bankruptcy in 2002, and emerged from the bankruptcy in 2004 as a result of the support from investor Thermo Capital Partners ("Thermo"). But the company has not actually filed for bankruptcy again since that time.

    It is important to keep in mind that at a share price of $1.00, Globalstar would still have a market cap of nearly $900 million, which is still a lofty valuation.
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AMG 971 133.147
AMS 3 73
Amsterdam Commodities 305 6.686
AMT Holding 199 7.047
Anavex Life Sciences Corp 2 485
Antonov 22.632 153.605
Aperam 92 14.960
Apollo Alternative Assets 1 17
Apple 5 381
Arcadis 252 8.733
Arcelor Mittal 2.033 320.620
Archos 1 1
Arcona Property Fund 1 286
arGEN-X 17 10.288
Aroundtown SA 1 219
Arrowhead Research 5 9.724
Ascencio 1 26
ASIT biotech 2 697
ASMI 4.108 39.087
ASML 1.766 106.207
ASR Nederland 21 4.452
ATAI Life Sciences 1 7
Atenor Group 1 484
Athlon Group 121 176
Atrium European Real Estate 2 199
Auplata 1 55
Avantium 32 13.639
Axsome Therapeutics 1 177
Azelis Group 1 64
Azerion 7 3.392